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Recent studies of visual perception have begun to reveal the connection between neuronal activity in the brain and conscious visual
experience. Transcranial magnetic stimulation of the human occipital lobe disrupts the normal perception of objects in ways suggesting
that important aspects of visual perception are based on activity in early visual cortical areas. Recordings made with microelectrodes in
animals suggest that the perception of the lightness and depth of visual surfaces develops through computations performed across
multiple brain areas. Activity in earlier areas is more tightly correlated with the physical properties of objects whereas neurons in later
areas respond in a manner more similar to visual perception.
Neuroscience research over the past 40 years has revealedthat there are roughly 30 different visual areas in the
primate brain, and that within these areas there are parallel
streams of processing and distinct modules (1, 2). But how is
neuronal activity in the different areas related to our conscious
visual perception? How can our unitary visual experience be
based on neural activity spread across distinct streams of pro-
cessing in multiple brain areas? The answers to these questions
have profound implications for our understanding of the rela-
tionship between mind and brain. Whereas earlier pioneering
work focused on the delineation of visual areas in the brain and
the neurons’ basic response properties, recent research attempts
to expose the roles different areas play in perception and the
extent to which there are hierarchies of visual computations.
Conscious visual experience is thought to be based on activity in
visual areas of cerebral cortex, which receive input from the retina.
Early cortical structures are organized topographically with regard
to the visual world. This topography can be exploited to investigate
the role of different visual areas in perception. For example,
neuronal activity in visual cortex can be locally blocked by trans-
cranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and the effect on visual per-
ception in the corresponding portion of the visual field can be
assessed. Kamitani and Shimojo (3) briefly (40–80 ms) presented
a large grid pattern to human observers, and after a delay of 80–170
ms, a single pulse of TMS was given to the occipital lobe. The TMS
caused the observers to perceive a disk-shaped patch of homoge-
neous color in the visual field on the opposite side from the side of
the brain given TMS (TMS-induced scotoma). When the visual
stimulus was a grating composed of parallel lines rather than a
rectilinear grid, the scotoma was distorted and appeared to be an
ellipse with its short axis along the contours. This contour-
dependent distortion appeared to reflect long-range interactions
between neurons selectively responsive to similar orientations (4).
Interestingly, the color perceived inside the scotoma was consistent
with that of the background, which was presented after, not before,
the grid or grating. Thus there appears to be filling-in backward in
time to compensate for the local information blocked by the TMS.
This is just one example from a large body of evidence suggesting
that neural activity in early visual cortex is necessary for conscious
experience of perception, and that neuronal connections and
interactions at these levels are reflected in the content of percep-
tion.
Perception is actually much more complex than a simple
topographical representation of the visual world. Its primary
goal is to recover the features of external objects—a process
termed unconscious inference by von Helmholtz (5, 6). What we
see is actually more than what is imaged on the retina. For
example, we perceive a three-dimensional world full of objects
despite the fact that there is a simple two-dimensional image on
each retina. In general, a particular retinal image may corre-
spond to more than one object. For example, a circular patch of
light on the retina could result from viewing a cylinder on end
or a round ball from any perspective. Thus perception is
inevitably an ambiguity-solving process. The perceptual system
generally reaches the most plausible global interpretation of the
retinal input by integrating local cues, as will be illustrated in the
case of lightness perception next.
Black-and-white photographs make it clear that lightness
alone conveys a great deal of information. The perception of
lightness is far from a ‘‘pixel-by-pixel’’ representation of the light
level on the retina. It is actually strongly influenced by context.
Thus a gray piece of paper appears darker if it is surrounded by
white than black (Fig. 1A). Although this deviation of lightness
perception from physical reality might appear to be a case of a
perceptual error, the spatial interactions underlying it may have
an important perceptual purpose. We perceive surface lightness
to be constant across surprisingly large changes in ambient
illumination, a phenomenon called lightness constancy. In this
example, as in other cases of perceptual constancy, the lighting
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Fig. 1. (A) Lightness induction. The small gray squares are identical but the one
surroundedbyblackappears lighterthanthesquaresurroundedbywhite. (B)The
response of a V1 neuron to a lightness induction stimulus. The receptive field of
the neuron was centered on a uniform gray square. The luminance of the
surrounding area was sinusoidally modulated. The cell’s response was synchro-
nized to the surround modulation and correlated with the perceived lightness of
the central patch, even though nothing changed within the receptive field.
[Reproduced with permission from ref. 14 (Copyright 2001, National Academy of
Sciences).]
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and viewing conditions affect the retinal image of objects, and
extensive spatial integration and normalization are performed to
recover the constant attributes of the objects themselves.
At what point in the visual pathway from retina to the many
cortical visual areas does the neural activity correlate with what we
perceive? Do neurons in the retina, primary visual cortex (V1), and
higher-level cortical areas contribute to perception equally? Or
instead, does perception have a specific locus in the brain? To tackle
these questions, Paradiso and coworkers (7, 8) assess the compu-
tations neurons perform in different visual areas and the extent to
which neural responses correlate with either the physical or per-
ceptual attributes of objects. They found that responses of neurons
in the retina and visual thalamus depend on light level but they do
not correlate with perceived lightness. These neurons appear to
primarily encode information about the location of contours in the
visual scene. Only in V1 were cells found that had responses
correlated with perceived lightness (Fig. 1B). They also found that
the average response of neurons in V1 is lightness constant. Thus
the response of the neurons is relatively immune to changes in
overall illumination—a property without which lightness would be
of little behavioral value. These findings suggest that lightness
information is first explicitly represented in visual cortex and that
responses correlated with visual perception build in stages across
multiple visual areas. The results combined with findings from
other labs suggest that early visual processing focuses on the
extraction of object contours, secondary processing stages are
involved with the computation of lightness and later processing
assigns color to objects.
As mentioned previously, the visual system has the difficult
task of understanding a complex three-dimensional world from
two-dimensional images on each retina. Images of objects at a
distance other than at the fixation plane are projected to
different relative positions on the two retinas. The relative
position difference, called binocular disparity, provides an im-
portant cue for the brain’s computation of distance. However,
there is much more to distance perception than the interpreta-
tion of binocular disparity. Consider a retinal image of a cross
with crossed disparities (disparities that lead to perception of
objects closer than the plane of fixation) added to the ends of the
horizontal arms. Because of the disparities, the vertical edges of
the horizontal arms can be unambiguously determined as being
closer to the observer, whereas the depth of the horizontal edges
remains ambiguous because there is no fixed disparity between
the two retinal images. Two different three-dimensional objects
are equally consistent with the retinal image: a horizontal bar in
front of a vertical bar and a cross with horizontal arms bent
forward. However, humans and monkeys almost always perceive
the former (9, 10). The brain selects one interpretation among
the possible surface structures.
The inferior temporal cortex (IT) represents the final stage of
the visual pathway crucial for object recognition. Neurons in IT
respond to shape, color, or texture. Recent studies show that
many IT neurons also convey information on disparity (11) and
disparity gradients (12). These findings lead to a new view that
IT is involved in some aspects of depth perception. Indeed, the
activity of some IT neurons encodes information on the relative
depth order of surfaces rather than the local absolute disparity
cues of the stimulus. For example, a population of IT neurons
responds more strongly to a horizontal bar in front of a vertical
bar than to a vertical bar in front of a horizontal bar, regardless
of whether crossed or uncrossed disparities are added (Fig. 2).
Other cells prefer different surface structures. This behavior of
IT neurons is in contrast to that of disparity-selective V1 neurons
that respond to local absolute disparity (13). Thus, the pathway
from V1 to IT transforms information about binocular disparity
that is based on the optics of the eye into a perceptually relevant
representation of information about surface structure.
The studies of lightness perception and depth perception lead
to a similar conclusion about the relationship between brain
activity and conscious visual perception. Rather than being
based on neural activity in one special area, visual perception
involves progressive computations spread across multiple brain
areas. Both early areas, as in the TMS study, and later areas, as
in the study of area IT, are involved in perception. The visual
system masterfully recovers information about the objects in our
environment based partly on processes of integration and nor-
malization and partly on hard-wired probabilities of what objects
are most likely to result from particular retinal images.
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Fig. 2. (A) The relationship between disparity type and location and surface
depth order perceived. Responses of IT neurons to these four stimuli were
tested to determine whether their activity correlates with the perceived
surface structure or with the type of disparity.
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